Governing Without Ownership: A Five‑Layer Model of Institutional Power and Innovation Governance in a Small State

Abstract:

This article develops a structural model of institutional power reproduction in small states with dense interconnections and significant state involvement in economic and innovation governance. Using Slovenia as an illustrative case, it proposes a five-layer framework—political, bureaucratic-technocratic, state-managed economic, network, and interpretive—through which influence, coordination, and legitimacy are reproduced.

The central argument is that elite continuity and limited systemic transformation result less from private ownership or ideology, than from coordinated access to publicly managed resources, institutional positions, and overlapping income, property, and network advantages. Extending Milanović’s concept of homoploutia, the paper introduces a Slovenia-specific notion of institutional homoploutia: the cumulative overlap of high income, property, public appointments, regulatory access, and network power.

A focused analysis of party organization identifies hierarchical, leader-dominated structures as a loyalty-based selection mechanism that narrows renewal. Combined with administrative continuity and network closure, this configuration stabilizes power within both governance and innovation systems. The model contributes to debates on state capitalism, innovation governance, and elite reproduction by specifying how small states can govern without ownership: through access, embeddedness, and coordinated institutional roles.